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1 Introduction
In recent years, the focus of debates about the determinants of countries in-
ternational competitiveness has shifted from the relative performance of sectors
and industries to that of rms within sectors. The increasing availability of good
quality rm-level data has highlighted the existence of substantial heterogene-
ity in virtually all performance indicators across rms within industries and has
drawn attention to the role played by intra-sectoral rm level adjustments and
reallocations in determining the export performance of industries and countries.
A key stylised fact emerging from the empirical literature is that di¤erences in
bilateral export volumes between countries (resulting from standard gravity
factors such as distance and country size) reect both an extensive margin
e¤ect of gravity (with more rms exporting to closer and larger countries) and
an intensive margin one (with a similar number of rms each exporting a
larger average quantity to the closer/larger market), with the former being of-
ten stronger than the latter - as highlighted for Europe by a recent Bruegel and
CEPR report, [12]. This report o¤ers a systematic, cross-country, rm-level
evidence of the internationalisation of European rms. Specically, it nds that
the international performance of European countries is essentially driven by a
relatively small number of high-performance rms1 , with international markets
liberalisation inducing a selection process whereby the most productive rms
substitute the least productive ones within sectors. The report ([12], p. 1) un-
derlines that internationalized rms in the covered European countries belong
to an exclusive club. They are di¤erent from other rms. They are bigger,
generate higher value added, pay higher wages, employ more capital per worker
and more skilled workers and have higher productivity. For instance, the wage
premium of exporters over non exporters is: 1.02 for Germany, 1.07 for Italy,
1.08 for Norway, 1.09 for France, 1.15 for the United Kingdom, 1.26 for Belgium,
and 1.44 for Hungary.2
This evidence has potentially important implications for both the e¤ects
of continuing international liberalisation of markets and for the policy actions
that might be undertaken by governments concerned on promoting national
industries.
In response to these observed stylised facts, recent theoretical developments
have provided microfoundations for the existence of inter-rm di¤erences in
productivity, performance and behaviour. Montagna o¤ers an early analysis
of the e¤ects of inter-rm cost heterogeneity on the e¤ects of monopolistically
competitive market structures [13] and later highlights the e¤ects of trade lib-
eralisation on rms selection [14] in the presence of inter-country di¤erences
in rmse¢ ciency distributions. Melitz [10] introduces a xed export cost in
an environment characterised by uncertainty about after-entry e¢ ciency and
shows how rms with di¤erent e¢ ciencies self-select into di¤erent behaviours,
1 In general, the top 1%, 5% and 10% exporters account for no less than 40%, 70% and 80%
of aggregate exports, what is referred to as the superstars exportersphenomenon (Bruegel
and CEPR Report, [12]).
2See Table 4 in the Bruegel and CEPR Report, [12])
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with only more productive rms choosing to become exporters.3
Although a large body of literature has focused on the e¤ects of intra-rm
di¤erences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted
to the interaction between rmsselection and international performance and
labour market institutions in contrast with the centrality of the latter to cur-
rent policy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for
national policies and institutions.4 Conventional wisdom in this area rests on
traditional views of the standard distortions resulting from labour market im-
perfections views contending that, in the interest of competitiveness, labour
markets deregulation is a necessary response to globalisation.
Labour market imperfections, however, may not have entirely obvious ef-
fects on the equilibrium e¢ ciency distribution of rms. In this paper, we study
the e¤ects of labour market unionisation on the process of competitive selection
between heterogeneous rms and analyse how the interaction between the two
is a¤ected by trade liberalisation between countries characterised by di¤erent
unionisation patterns. To this end, we develop a model characterised by imper-
fect competition in both goods and factor markets and by rms heterogeneity.
Specically, we assume that labour markets are unionised and analyse the e¤ects
of the bargaining power of rm specic unions on industry selection and on the
e¤ects of trade liberalisation between two countries characterised by di¤erent
labour union strengths. The endogenous determination of wages via bargain-
ing between heterogeneous rms and rm specic unions implies that wages will
di¤er between rms and that ex-ante identical workers will perceive di¤erent
equilibrium wages. We are therefore able to examine the e¤ects of unions bar-
gaining power on the distribution of rms productivities. We show that more
powerful unions will allow more entry of less e¢ cient rms. The intuition for
this result is that, for a given bargaining power, a unions rent extraction ability
will be higher the higher is the productivity of the rm with which it negotiates.
As a result, a given increase in the bargaining power of unions will translate in
proportionally higher wage demands in relatively more e¢ cient rms i.e. an
increase in the bargaining power of unions will hurt (via a higher wage) more
e¢ cient rms proportionally more than less e¢ cient ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a closed economy version
of the model. Its long run equilibrium properties are discussed in Section 3 while
Section 4 focuses on the welfare analysis. The framework is extended to a two-
country world in Section 5, while Section 6 derives and discusses its long run
equilibrium properties.
3A large body of literature has originated that extends Melitz seminal contribution. In
a di¤erent class of models, e.g. Bernard et al [1] and Eaton and Kortum [5], stochastic
rm productivity are introduced into a multi-country Ricardian framework, with rms using
di¤erent technology to produce the same good in the presence of market segmentation.
4There are some notable exceptions. Egger and Kreickemeier [6] analyse the impact of trade
liberalisation on rmsselection in the presence of a fair-wage e¤ort mechanism. Helpman and
Itskhoki [7] focus on the e¤ects of hiring and ring rigidities on trade and unemployment in the
presence of heterogeneous rms. Within a similar framework, Helpman et al [8] analyse the
distributional consequences of international trade. Cuñat and Melitz [2] study the relationship
between volatility, labor market exibility, and international trade.
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2 The closed economy
We consider an economy populated by L identical households supplying labour
services hired to produce two kinds of goods: a di¤erentiated good, produced
in a monopolistic sector, and a homogeneous good, produced in a competitive
sector. Workers in the monopolistic sectors are organised in rm-specic unions
which bargain with rms over the wage. A rm entering the monopolistic sector
faces a xed cost in order to develop a new product and start its production,
which, subsequently, occurs according to a constant returns to scale technology.
We think of the xed entry cost as including the cost of setting up plants and
production lines, as well as R&D activity aimed at both product and process de-
velopment. The outcome of the initial R&D activity is uncertain and rms learn
about their actual production cost levels (productivities) only (i) after making
the irreversible investment required for entry, and (ii) before bargaining with
the union over the wage level. The rm specic unions also know rmsproduc-
tivity levels before bargaining. Hence, after having discovered their productivity
levels rms that can cover their marginal cost will survive and produce, while all
other rms will exit the industry. Note that, as is standard in the monopolistic
competition literature, we assume there to be a continuum of N potential rms,
each su¢ ciently small so as to ignore the impact of its actions on the behaviour
of its competitors. Thus, while rms in this sector enjoy, by virtue of product
di¤erentiation, some monopoly power, there is no strategic interaction between
them.
2.1 Preferences
Consumer preferences, dened over both the di¤erentiated good and the ho-
mogeneous good, are described by the following quadratic quasi-linear utility
function:5
U(q0 ; q
(i); i 2 [0; N ]) = q0 + 
NZ
0
q(i)di  1
2

NZ
0
q(i)2di  1
2

0@ NZ
0
q(i)di
1A2 ,
(1)
where q(i) is a typical household  0s consumption level of variety i of the dif-
ferentiated good, q0 is its consumption of the homogeneous good, and N is the
mass of varieties of the di¤erentiated good; ,  and  are positive preference pa-
rameters. Specically,  captures the degree of consumersbias towards product
di¤erentiation (i.e. towards a dispersed consumption of varieties); both  and
 capture the intensity of preferences for the di¤erentiated good with respect to
the numeraire (this intensity increases in  and decreases in ); a higher  also
reects a higher degree of substitutability between varieties.
5A major drawback of using the quasi-linear utility function is that it rules out general
equilibrium income e¤ects. However, one important advantage of the linear model is that,
by endogenising the optimal price-cost mark-up of rms, it allows for the identication of
pro-competitive e¤ects that emerge from the interaction between goods and factor markets.
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The budget constraint of a typical household is given by:
NZ
0
p(i)q(i)di+ p0q

0 = I + p0q0, (2)
where p0 and q0 are respectively the price and the household initial endowment
of the competitive good, and I is the households income. We shall assume
that a typical household supplies one unit of labour inelastically and that its
labour services can be hired by both a rm in the monopolistic sector and by
producers in the competitive sector. Denoting, with wm and wc the wage rate
paid by rms in the monopolistic sector and by rms in the competitive sector
respectively, the expected income of a typical household  employed by rm i
will then be given by:
I = wm(i)l

m(i) + wcl

c (i),
where lm(i) is the amount of work performed in rm i of the monopolistic sector
by household , and lc (i) = 1  lm(i) is the amount of work it performs in the
competitive sector.6 It is obvious that when wm(i) > wc a consumer strictly
prefers to work for a rm in the monopolistic sector, and the condition to have
at least some workers employed in this sector requires that wm(i)  wc.
The level of employment in the monopolistic sector is determined by demand;
the remaining labour supply is absorbed by the competitive sector which will
clear the labour market.7
Maximisation of consumers utility yields the inverse of the individual de-
mand for each variety produced by the monopolistic sector:
p(i) =   q(i)  Q , (3)
where Q =
NZ
0
q(i)di is total individual consumption of the di¤erentiated good.
The price threshold for positive demand for variety i is:
p(i) =
1
N + 
(+ N p) , (4)
where p is the average price of varieties sold in the economy. A price above this
threshold would result in a rm having to exit the market.
6 It is of course possible to envisage di¤erent employment congurations for the typical
househod (e.g. with employment in only one of the sectors, or even with employment in more
than one monopolistic rm). For simplicity, we rule out these cases by assumption as they
would not substantially alter the qualitative nature of the results.
7Note that household incomes should be increased (reduced) by prots (losses) gained
(su¤ered) by workers as owners of shares of rms in the monopolistic sector. However, given
that in the long run the expected (and actual) total prots are equal to the xed costs of
innovation, they do not appear into (2).
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Finally, the aggregate demand function for each rm can be written as fol-
lows:
q(i) = L


( + N)
 

1
( + N)
+

 ( + N)
N

p(i) +

 ( + N)
P

, (5)
with q(i) = Lq(i) and P =
NZ
0
p(i)di.
2.2 Production
In both sectors, all goods are produced with labour as the only factor of produc-
tion. In the competitive sector, the production of one unit of the homogeneous
good requires one unit of labour. Given that when discussing the properties of
the open economy we shall assume that the good produced in the competitive
sector is freely traded, it is convenient to use this good as the numeraire and
set its price at unity, i.e. p0 = 1.
In order to start producing, each rm i entering the monopolistic sector
bears a xed cost fE in terms of the homogeneous good that covers both the
cost of entry (e.g. the cost of setting up plants and production lines) and that
of the innovation required in developing the variety of the good. This cost is
sunk after entry. To produce a quantity q(i) of the good, a typical rm i needs
lm(i) units of labour, as described by the following production function:
q(i) =
lm(i)
c(i)
, (6)
where c(i), the quantity of labour required to produce one unit of the good, is an
inverse measure of the productivity of rm i and is our source of heterogeneity.
Therefore, after developing a new variety, subsequent production by a rm in
this sector exhibits constant returns to scale. The wage perceived by the workers
employed by rm i in the monopolistic sector, wm(i), is set in a bargaining
process involving rm specic unions we will return later to the bargaining
process that determines wm(i). Prior to entry, all rms are identical. Since R&D
is an uncertain activity, however, it is plausible to assume that it is only after
making the irreversible investment fE required for entry, plants and product
development, that a rm learns how productive its technology, as measured by
the parameter 1=c(i), is. Thus, we assume that the sunk investment delivers a
new horizontally di¤erentiated variety with a random unit labour requirement
c(i) drawn from some cumulative distribution, G(c). As a result, R&D generates
a distribution of entrants across marginal costs, with a rm i that produces
in the economy facing the marginal cost of production wm(i)c(i). Thus, the
variable cost function of a rm supplying variety i is:
V C(i) = wm(i)c(i)q(i), (7)
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and its operating prots, (i), are given by:
(i) = p(i)q(i)  V C(i),
which, using (7), can be re-written as:
(i) = [p(i)  wm(i)c(i)] q(i). (8)
Hence, the price and the quantity which maximize the prot of rm i must
satisfy the following relationship:
q(i) =
L

[p(i)  wm(i)c(i)] . (9)
Maximizing prots in (8) with respect to price subject to the aggregate
demand in (5), we get the price set by each rm:
p(i) =
wm(i)c(i)
2
+
P + 
2 ( +N)
. (10)
Using (9) into (8), we obtain maximised operating prots:
(i) =
L

[p(i)  wm(i)c(i)]2 . (11)
Finally, note that, from equations (6) and (9), we can derive the quantity of
labour demanded by rm i, lm(i):
lm(i) =
Lc(i)

[p(i)  wm(i)c(i)] . (12)
Then, using equations (6) and (12), it will prove useful to rewrite the prot
function in (8) in terms of lm(i), to obtain:
(i) =

Lc2(i)
l2m(i). (13)
2.3 Unions
In the homogenous perfectly competitive good sector, the labour market is per-
fectly competitive and all employers pay the same wage. Since the price of the
good and the value of the marginal product of labour in this sector are both
xed at unity, the wage rate perceived by the labour employed in the produc-
tion of the homogeneous good wc, is also equal to 1. In contrast, labour in
the monopolistic sector is unionised, with wages set by a bargaining process
between rm specic unions and rms. We adopt the right to manage model,
which, for appropriate parameter values, collapses into the monopoly model. In
the right to manage model, employment is determined unilaterally by each rm
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(the employer) and the wage is determined in a bargaining process between the
rm specic union and the rm.
The Nash bargaining solution to the rm specic right to manage model is
obtained by:
max
wm(i)
i = v log [Vi (wm(i); lm(i))] + (1  v) log [ (wm(i); lm(i))  0(i)] , (14)
subject to the labour demand in (12) and to the price given by equation (10),
where 0 < v  1 represents the bargaining power of the union. Notice that when
v = 1, we fall back to the monopoly model in which employment is unilaterally
determined by the employer, and the wage is unilaterally xed by the union,
taking into account the e¤ect of changes in wages on employment and on prices.
A rm i will maximize its prots above its reservation utility, 0(i), which
we set at zero without loss of generality. A union i will maximize the total
labour rent above the constant wage paid to non-unionised workers, given by:
Vi (wm(i); lm(i)) = lm(i) [wm(i)  wc] , (15)
where wc = 1.
Hence, substituting the operating prots in (13) and the unions payo¤ in
equation (15) into the Nash bargaining product in (14), the bargaining problem
of a rm/union pair can be rewritten as follows:
max
wm(i)
i = v log flm(i) [wm(i)  1]g+ (1  v) log


Lc2(i)
lm(i)
2

,
subject to the labour demand equation in (12) and the equilibrium price in (10).
The rst order condition @i=@wm(i) = 0 requires that:
dlm(i)
dw(i)
(2  v) + v lm(i)
[wm(i)  1] = 0. (16)
From the labour demand equation in (12) we obtain:
dlm(i)
dw(i)
=
Lc(i)


dp(i)
dw(i)
  c(i)

, (17)
where dp(i)dw(i) can be derived from equation (10) as:
@p(i)
@w(i)
=
c(i)
2
. (18)
Then, using equations (17), (18) and (12), the rst order condition in (16) can
be solved to derive the following wage equation:
wm(i) = 1 +
2v
(v + 2) c(i)
[p(i)  c(i)] . (19)
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Since wm(i)  wc = 1 must hold in equilibrium, the wage equation in (19)
implies that the following condition must also hold: p(i)  c(i). However,
note that for expressions (9) and (11) to be positive, it must be the case that
p(i)  wm(i)c(i); making use of the wage equation in (19), this condition is
satised if and only if:
p(i)  c(i), (20)
which, in turn, always implies that wm(i)  wc = 1.
3 The long-run equilibrium
Prior to entry, a rms expected prot is
R cD
0
(c)dG(c) fE . If expected prots
were negative, no rm would enter the market. With unrestricted entry, rms
would however continue to enter till expected prots are driven to zero, that is
until the zero-protentry condition below is satised:Z cD
0
(c)dG(c) = fE .
If (after paying the xed cost fE) a rm draws a low productivity, it may decide
to exit immediately and not produce. The entry condition above identies a
threshold, or cut-o¤, level of technical e¢ ciency at which a rm will be indif-
ferent between staying in the market or exiting, which we shall denote by cD.
Firms with a level of c(i) = cD will just break even. Thus, the cut-o¤ level, cD,
is dened by the following equivalent zero prot condition:
cD = sup fc : (cD) = 0g , (21)
which describes the indi¤erence condition of marginal rms (i.e. the rms that
are just able to cover their e¤ective marginal costs of production). Using equa-
tions (19) and (11) in (21), we obtain:
(cD) = 0() p(cD) = cDwmD, (22)
where wmD is the wage paid by marginal rms with productivity 1=cD. Thus,
cD denotes the upper limit of the range of c of rms actually producing in
the economy. More productive entrants with a value of c(i) < cD will start
producing, while entrants with a value of c < cD will exit the market.
Note that using the price from equation (22) into the wage equation in (19)
we obtain:
wmD = 1, (23)
that is, the marginal rms will pay a wage that equals the competitive wage.
The optimal prices, p(i), and output levels, q (i), can now be written as
functions of the cut-o¤:
p(i) =
(v + 2) cD + (2  v) c(i)
4
and q(i) =
(2  v)L
4
[cD   c(i)] . (24)
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Similarly, maximized prot levels can be written as:
(i) =
L (2  v)2
16
[cD   c(i)]2 . (25)
Dening the absolute markup of a rm that has a unit labour requirement of
c(i) as (i) = p(i)  wm(i)c(i), we can write it in terms of the cut-o¤ point as:
(i) =
1
4
(2  v) [cD   c(i)] . (26)
Moreover, revenues of a rm of type i are given by:
r(i) =
(2  v)L [(v + 2) cD + (2  v) c(i)] [cD   c(i)]
16
.
Finally, note that, substitution of p(i) from (24) into (19) yields:
wm(i) = 1 +
v
2

cD
c(i)
  1

. (27)
Thus, for a given v, rms with lower unit labour requirements will set lower
prices, sell larger quantities, earn higher revenues and have larger prots than
less e¢ cient rms.8 Their absolute markup will also be higher, even though
they pay higher wages, as a result of the higher rent extraction ability that
their higher relative e¢ ciency allows their rm specic unions.
Following Melitz and Ottaviano [11], we adopt a Pareto distribution as the
specic parametrisation of G(c).9 This distribution has a higher unit labour
requirement bound cM and shape parameter   1:
G(c) =

c
cM

; c 2 [0; cM ]. (28)
The implication of this parametrisation is that large rms are less frequent than
small rms, with the shape parameter  indexing the dispersion of unit labour
requirement draws. When  = 1, the unit labour requirement distribution
is uniform on [0; cM ]. As  increases, the relative number of high unit labour
requirement rms increases, and the distribution is more concentrated at higher
values of c. As  goes to innity, the distribution becomes degenerate at cM .
Given (28), the average unit labour requirement of entrants evaluates to c =
cM=( + 1), with variance equal to c=[( + 2)]. Thus, the higher cM , the
higher the mean and the variance of the unit labour requirement draws.
Using the chosen parametrization in (28) and the optimized prots in (25),
the free-entry condition then results in the following closed form solution for the
cut-o¤ level:
cD =
"
8 (+ 1) (+ 2) fEc

M
L (2  v)2
#1=(+2)
, (29)
8For v = 0, results correspond to those in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
9Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano [3] show that the Pareto distribution is a good approxi-
mation for 11 European Countries.
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which implies that the elasticity of the long-run cut-o¤ level cD with respect to
v will be given by:
@cD
@v
v
cD
=
2v
(+ 2) (2  v) > 0. (30)
This means that an increase in the bargaining power of unions, v, results in
an increase in the cut-o¤ cD (that is, in a reduction of the productivity cut-
o¤ level). In other words, more powerful unions will allow more entry of less
e¢ cient rms. The intuition for this result is that, for a given bargaining power,
a unions rent extraction ability will be higher the higher is the productivity of
the rm with which it negotiates. As a result, a given increase in the bargaining
power of unions will translate in proportionally higher wage demand in relatively
more e¢ cient rms  i.e. an increase in v will hurt (via a higher wage) more
e¢ cient rms proportionally more than less e¢ cient ones.10
Consistently, using equations (24), (25), (26) and (28) to compute producer
average performance measures, we nd that whilst our results coincide with
those in Melitz and Ottaviano [11] when the unions have no bargaining power
(that is when v = 0), as v increases, the average value of the inverse of produc-
tivity (c) and of prices (p) increases, while those of the average markup () and
prots () fall as shown by the expressions below:
c =

+ 1
cD, p =
(4+ v + 2)
4 (+ 1)
cD,  =
1
4
(2  v) cD
(+ 1)
(31)
 =
L (v   2)2 c2D
8 (+ 1) (+ 2)
. (32)
Finally, note that, on average, producers (i.e. rms that survive in equi-
librium) are more productive than entrants, given that the cut-o¤ cD is lower
than the upper bound cM . Thus, competitive selection implies that adopted
technologies are on average more productive than available technologies.
Turning to the individual rm, wages wm(i) are increasing in the bargaining
power of the union v, and that q(i), (i) and (i) are increasing in v only for
c > =( + 2)cD (or they are decreasing for c < =( + 2)cD). Moreover, if
c < =(+2)cD, then p(i) is increasing in v. Otherwise if c > =(+2)cD, p(i)
is increasing in v only when v < 2 + 8cDcD c 2c = 
, while it is decreasing in v
when  < v  1. It then follows that if, for instance, v < , any increase in v
will result in an increase in prices. However, since the rent extraction ability of
unions increases with rmsproductivity, a higher v will result in an increase in
markup and prots only for relatively less productive rms, because for them
the increase in wages is relatively smaller with respect to the increase in prices,
than the increase in wages registered by more productive rms.
The equilibrium mass of sellers N can be found by evaluating equation (4)
for the marginal rm (i.e. at c(i) = cD) and imposing the zero-prot condition
10A su¢ cient condition that ensures that cD < cM is thatq
[8 (+ 1) (+ 2) fE ]=[L (2  v)2] < cM .
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in (22) to obtain:
cD =
1
N + 
(+ N p) . (33)
Substituting p from equation (31) into equation (33), the number of rms selling
in the economy can be determined as:
N =
4 (+ 1) 
 (2  v)
  cD
cD
. (34)
Clearly, for N to be positive,  needs to be greater than cD. Furthermore, a
ceteris paribus increase in the bargaining power of unions will have an ambiguous
e¤ect on the population of surviving rms. Specically, an increase in v will
result in an increase in N when  > (+ 2) cD=, and in a fall in N when
 < (+ 2) cD=. Hence, even if the increase in v will allow more entry of less
e¢ cient rms, it will result in a larger number of rms only if the preference for
the di¤erentiated good (as indexed by ) is su¢ ciently strong.
Finally, the number of entrants will be given by:
NE = N=G(cD). (35)
To summarise, an increase in the bargaining power of unions will have three
main e¤ects: (i) a variety e¤ect by resulting in an increase in the mass of
rms selling in the economy when the preference for the di¤erentiated good is
su¢ ciently strong, (ii) a counter competitive e¤ect since a higher v results in
higher average prices, which in turn entail lower average markups and prots
for rms, and (iii) a selection e¤ect via an increase in cD, which results from
the markups and prots of less productive rms increasing more than those of
more productive ones.
4 Welfare
Before proceeding to extending the model to an open economy setting, it is
interesting to investigate the e¤ects of the presence of unions, and specically
their bargaining power, on the level of welfare in the closed economy setting.
Since free entry implies that aggregate prots vanish in equilibrium, welfare
in the economy is given by consumer surplus only. In particular, consumers
surplus, W , is:
W  I + q0 +B, (36)
where B is common to all workers and is dened as:
B  1
2

 +

N
 1
(  p)2 + 1
2
N

2p, (37)
in which 2p is the variance of prices, given by:
2p =
(2  v)2
16

(+ 2) (+ 1)
2 (cD)
2 . (38)
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Note that, B and, consequently, welfare decrease in p, while they increase in
both N (this is the standard love of variety e¤ect) and 2p (as in Melitz and
Ottaviano [11], this last e¤ect reects consumerss re-optimization and their
reallocation of expenditure towards both cheaper varieties and the numeraire
good).
It can be readily veried that the average price in (31) is increasing in v,
and that the variance of prices in (38) is decreasing in v. Therefore, inspection
of (37) reveals that B declines with v. This means that the negative e¤ects on
B resulting from (i) the increase in the average price and (ii) the decline in the
variance of prices more than o¤set the eventual positive e¤ect of an increase in
v on variety N .
Moreover, substituting p from (31) and 2p from (38), we notice that B can
be rewritten as follows:
B =
1
4
(  cD)

2  cD (2+ v + 2)
(+ 2)

, (39)
where the condition that  > cD implies that B > 0. From the previous
expression we derive that:
@B
@v
=   1
4
@cD
@v

2  cD (2+ v + 2)
(+ 2)

+ (  cD) (2+ v + 2)
(+ 2)

< 0.
(40)
To evaluate the total e¤ect of a change of v on welfare, we need to consider
both its e¤ect on B described by (40), which is common to all "households" 
and that on household income, I . Recalling that households may be employed
by di¤erent types of rms and thus perceive di¤erent incomes, we compute the
expected wage paid by rms in the economy, that is:
wm = 1 +
v
2 (  1) .
The average surplus in the economy is then given by:
W 
P
W
L
= I + q0 +B,
where the average households income, I, is given by the following expression:
I  V C N + wc(L 
lN)
L
=
(V C   l)N
L
+ 1. (41)
In the above, the average variable cost of production sustained by a rm, V C,
and the average labour demand of rms, l, are respectively given by:
V C =
L (2  v) (+ v)
4 (+ 1) (+ 2)
(cD)
2 ,
and
l =
L (2  v)
4 (+ 1) (+ 2)
(cD)
2 .
13
Hence, we nd that @ I@v R 0 if, and only if,  R cD [2v + 4 +  (2  v)] =[ (2  v)+
4], meaning that the average households income increases with v only if the
preference for the di¤erentiated good is su¢ ciently strong.
Thus, it is clear from this analysis that the existence of unionization inu-
ences the operation of the standard forces (such as number of rms and prices)
that a¤ect welfare in this type of models. Specically, we nd that when the
preference for the di¤erentiated good is su¢ ciently small, that is the value of 
is su¢ ciently low, an increase in the bargaining power of unions v will result in
a reduction of the welfare level given that it will not only increase the average
price, but also reduce the average households income, the variance of prices
and the number of rms. However, for a a su¢ ciently strong preference for the
di¤erentiated good, that is for a su¢ ciently large value of , this result can be
reversed: in this case the increase in the mass of sellers N and in the average
households income I that results from a higher bargaining power of unions will
have a positive e¤ect on welfare that more than o¤sets the negative e¤ect of
the increase in the average price and the decline in the variance of prices. This
is due to the fact that for large values of , consumers highly value the con-
sumption of the di¤erentiated good, and therefore an increase in the bargaining
power of unions - even tough it will favour the entry of less e¢ cient rms - will
increase the welfare level because it will extend the mass of rms selling in the
market. As a result this will also raise average households income, as can be
seen from equation (41). This suggests that, ultimately via its e¤ects on rm
selection, union power does not have unambiguously negative e¤ects on welfare
as implied by the standard distortionaryview of unionisation.
5 Open Economy
In the previous sections we analysed, within a closed economy model, the e¤ects
of unionisation and union power on industry structure, performance and selec-
tion. In this section we extend the analysis to consider a two country-setting
and examine how di¤erences in the two countries labour market institutions
(in the form of union bargaining power) a¤ect inter-market linkages and rela-
tive performance.
Consider two open economies, H and F , endowed with LH and LF house-
holds/workers respectively. Consumerspreferences are assumed to be the same
in both countries and are described by the utility function in (1), which leads
to the inverse demand function in (4).
On the production side, the homogeneous good is produced under conditions
of perfect competition and with the same technology in both countries. This
good is freely traded. Retaining this good as the numeraire implies that the wage
in this sector is equal to one in both countries. In the di¤erentiated sector, inter-
rm productivity di¤erences are modelled as described for the closed economy.
In each country, after paying an entry cost and discovering their productivity
level, rms bargain with the union over the wage, and then produce. In this
sector, markets are segmented, in the sense that rms producing in country
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j = H;F incur a per-unit trade cost z > 1 when selling their production abroad
in country z = H;F with j 6= z. Therefore, the delivered cost of a unit produced
in j with cost wjmX(i)c(i) and sold abroad in country z is 
zwjmX(i)c(i).
In each country, entrants draw their unit labour requirement parameters si-
multaneously from a Pareto distribution G(c). We assume that technology in
the two countries is the same, i.e. that they have identical productivity distri-
butions. Therefore, as in autarky, each rm will know its own cost parameter
c(i), as well as that of all other rms, only after paying the xed entry cost
fE . It will then decide whether to produce or not, or whether to export or not,
based on the prots it expects to make at home, jD(c(i)), and abroad, 
j
X(c(i))
(where the superscript j refers to the country in which the rm is located),
conditional on the productivity distribution of the entrants that will eventually
decide to produce.
We shall assume, by virtue of market segmentation in the nal good markets,
that each rm undertakes two separate bargaining processes with unions, one to
determine the remuneration of the labor employed to produce for the domestic
market, that is wjmD(i), and the other to set the wage for the labor employed
to produce for exports, wjmX(i) .
11 It then follows that rms characterized by a
cost parameter level c(i) produce for the local market j if, and only if:
jD(i) =
h
pjD(i)  wjmD(i)c(i)
i
qjD(i)  0,
and they export to z = H;F (j 6= z) if, and only if:
jX(i) =
h
pjX(i)  zwjmX(i)c(i)
i
qjX(i)  0.
Hence, given that markets are segmented, rms of type i will produce quan-
tities qjD(i) and q
j
X(i), that respectively maximize their local prots at home
and abroad when the relative demand functions are given by (4). These are
respectively given by:
qjD(i) =
Lj
h
pjD(i)  wjmD(i)c(i)
i

and qjX(i) =
Lz
h
pjX(i)  zwjmX(i)c(i)
i

.
(42)
Given the optimal quantities in (42), the maximized prots of rm i producing
and selling in country j and exporting to country z are then respectively given
11The existence of market segmentation in the good markets (due to the transport cost
incurred in exporting) implies that unions paired to rms that serve both domestic and foreign
consumers will have di¤erent rent extraction abilities in the two markets and will thus have
an incentive to set operation-specic wages. More specically, we can think of the rm as
having two distinct plants, one used for domestic production and one for producing exports,
with bargaining occurring at the plant, as opposed to the rm, level. It is worth pointing out
that allowing for the unions to bargain over a unique wage (for both the domestic and the
foreign market) would not alter the qualitative nature of our results, as the wage in this case
would be a convex combination of those obtained in the separate bargaining processes.
15
by:
jD(i) =
Lj
h
pjD(i)  wjmD(i)c(i)
i2

and jX(i) =
Lz
h
pjX(i)  zwjmX(i)c(i)
i2

.
(43)
Finally, from (6) and (42) we derive rm is labour demand to produce for
the domestic market j, ljmD(i):
ljmD(i) =
Ljc(i)

h
pjD(i)  wjmD(i)c(i)
i
, (44)
and to produce for the export market z, ljzmX(i):
ljzmX(i) =
zLzc(i)

h
pjX(i)  zwjmX(i)c(i)
i
. (45)
Then, using (44), (45) and (6), we can rewrite the maximized prots in (43)
in terms of the rms labour demands, ljmD(i) and l
jz
mX(i), that is:
jD(i) =

h
ljmD(i)
i2
Ljc2(i)
and jX(i) =

h
ljzmX(i)
i2
zLzc2(i)
. (46)
We can now move on to consider the wage determination bargaining process.
Substituting jD(i) from (46) and (15) into (14), the Nash Bargaining problem
for rms producing only for the domestic market j will be given by:
max
wjmD(i)
jiD = v
j log
h
ljmD(i)

wjmD(i)  1
i
+
 
1  vj log
8><>:

h
ljmD(i)
i2
Ljc2(i)
9>=>; ,
solution of which will yield the wage equation:
wjmD(i) = 1 + 2
vj
(vj + 2)c(i)
h
pjD(i)  c(i)
i
, (47)
which is similar to the wage equation (19) obtained for the closed economy.
The wage paid to the workers employed by a rm in j in the production for
the export market z is set by solving the following Nash bargaining problem:
max
wjmX(i)
jiX = v
j log
h
ljzmX(i)

wjmX(i)  1
i
+
 
1  vj log hjX(i)i ,
where jX(i) = 
[ljzmX(i)]
2
zLzc2(i) , from which we obtain the wage equation:
wjmX(i) = 1 + 2
vj
(vj + 2) c(i)
 
pjX(i)
z
  c(i)
!
. (48)
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Since wjmX(i)  wc = 1 must hold in equilibrium, the wage equation in (48)
implies that the following condition must also hold: pjX(i)  zc(i). However,
note that for expressions (42) and (43) to be positive, it must be the case that
pjX(i)  zwjmX(i)c(i); making use of the wage equation in (48), this condition
is satised if and only if:
pjX(i)  zc(i),
which, in turn, always implies that wjmX(i)  wc = 1.
6 The long run equilibrium in the open economy
The free entry and exit condition of rms implies that expected prots are driven
to zero in equilibrium. This allows us to identify two cut-o¤s for c that dene
respectively the upper limit of the range of c over which rms produce only for
the local market j, and the upper limit of the range of c over which rms export
to country z. Denoting these two cut-o¤ points as cjD and c
j
X resectively, for a
given number of entrants in country j, N jE , a mass N
j
D = G
j(cjD)N
j
E of rms
will sell only in the domestic market and a mass N jX = G
j(cjX)N
j
E of rms will
export. Given that rms would be forced to leave if their prots were negative,
the cut-o¤ levels for rms that sell in the domestic market only and for rms
that export are dened respectively by:
cjD = sup
n
c : jD(c
j
D) = 0
o
, (49)
cjX = sup
n
c : jX(c
j
X) = 0
o
,
which describe the (zero-prot) indi¤erence conditions of marginal rms. The
zero prot conditions in (49) imply that the rms that are just able to cover their
marginal costs for domestic and export sales are, respectively, characterized by:
jD(c
j
D) = 0() pj(cjD) = wjmDcjD, (50)
jX(c
j
X) = 0() pz(cjX) = zwjmXcjX ,
where wjmD is the wage paid by marginal rms with labor requirement c
j
D, and
wjmX is the wage paid by marginal rms with labor requirement c
j
X .
12 By
substituting the price from (50) into (47) and (48), it is easy to verify that the
wage paid by both types of marginal rms will be equal to one, i.e. to the
competitive wage, that is:
wjmD = 1 (51)
and
wjmX = 1. (52)
12 It is clear from (50) that the prices for the domestic and export markets would di¤er even
if the unions were to negotiate a common wage for workers employed to produce for home and
foreign consumers.
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It then follows that, using (51) and (52), (50) can be rewritten as:
pj(cjD) = c
j
D and p
z(cjX) = 
zcjX . (53)
If, as well show to be the case, results for the cut-o¤ levels in (53) are
such that cjD > c
j
X , then (50) allows us to identify three types of entrants in
country j: (1) less productive rms, with c > cjD, that will not be able to
produce - and hence will exit; (2) rms with intermediate productivity levels,
with cjD > c > c
j
X , that produce only for the local market; and (3) more
productive rms, with c < cjX , producing for both the domestic and export
markets.
Optimal prices and output levels for domestic and export sales can be written
as functions of the cut-o¤s:
pjD(i) =
 
vj + 2

cjD +
 
2  vj c(i)
4
;
pjX(i) =
z
h 
vj + 2

cjX +
 
2  vj c(i)i
4
;
qjD(i) =
 
2  vjLj
4
h
cjD   c(i)
i
;
qjX(i) =
z
 
2  vjLz
4
h
cjX   c(i)
i
;
(54)
with maximized prot levels respectively given by
jD(i) =
Lj
 
2  vj2
16
h
cjD   c(i)
i2
;
jX(i) =
(z)
2
Lz
 
2  vj2
16
h
cjX   c(i)
i2
:
(55)
The absolute markups obtained from domestic and export sales by a rm with
the cost parameter c(i) producing in j are given by:
jD(i) =
1
4
 
2  vj hcjD   c(i)i and jX(i) = z4  2  vj hcjX   c(i)i . (56)
Finally, substitution of prices from (54) into (47) and (48) yields:
wjmD(i) = 1 +
vj
2
 
cjD
c(i)
  1
!
and wjmX(i) = 1 +
vj
2
 
cjX
c(i)
  1
!
. (57)
It is clear from (57) that, as in the closed economy case, that unions operating
in more productive rms have a higher rent extraction ability and thus are able
to negotiate higher wages.
Thus, for given values of vj and z, rms with lower cost parameters c(i)
set lower prices, and sell larger quantities with larger prots, getting larger
(absolute) markups despite the fact that they pay higher wages.
In a two country setting, the equilibrium cut-o¤ points of one country will
depend on its trading partners parameters. Hence, the two countriese¢ ciency
cut-o¤ points need to be determined jointly. To do so, we need to solve the
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following free entry and exit condition for rms producing in j = H;F which
implies zero expected prots:Z cjD
0
jD(c)dG
j(c) +
Z cjX
0
jX(c)dG
j(c) = fE . (58)
Using the parametrization in (28) and the optimized prots in (55), the free-
entry condition in (58) can be rewritten as follows:
Lj

cjD
+2
+ (z)
2
Lz

cjX
+2
=
8cM (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
(2  vj)2 . (59)
Note that, from expressions (50), (51) and (52), we can derive a relationship
between the two cut-o¤s for domestic producers cjD in country j and foreign
exporters czX from country z to country j:
czX =
cjD
 j
, (60)
which depends on the accessibility of country j from z (determined by  j).
Making use of this relationship in (59) for both countries, we obtain the following
system of equations:8<: Lj

cjD
+2
+ (z)
2
Lz

cjX
+2
=
8cM (+1)(+2)fE
(2 vj)2
Lz (czD)
+2
+
 
 j
2
Lj (czX)
+2
=
8cM (+1)(+2)fE
(2 vz)2
,
that can be solved to derive cjD and c
z
D. If we dene 
j    j  2 (0; 1), which
represents an inverse measure of trade costs (i.e. the freenessof trade), then
we obtain:
cjD =
8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h
(2  vz)2    2  vj2 zi
Lj (2  vz)2 (2  vj)2 (1  zj)
9=;
1
+2
, (61)
czD =
8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h 
2  vj2   (2  vz)2 ji
Lz (2  vj)2 (2  vz)2 (1  jz)
9=;
1
+2
, (62)
with j; z = H;F and j 6= z.
Using the relationship in (60) and the two countries domestic cut-o¤s in
(61) and (62) it is then straightforward to obtain the two countries cut-o¤
for exporters. From (61) and (62) the two conditions that must be satised
in order to have positive values of both cjD and c
z
D respectively require that
(2  vz)2 >  2  vj2 z and  2  vj2 > (2  vz)2 j .
Hence, if a country j benets from a larger local market (i.e. a larger Lj)
and/or a better access to the foreign country (i.e. a larger z), it will exhibit
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a lower cut-o¤. On the contrary, an increase in the level of accessibility of the
country, j , by foreign exporters increases the domestic cut-o¤, cjD. All these
results are in line with those obtained by Melitz and Ottaviano [11]. Further-
more, making use of the condition required to have a positive value of cjD, we
are able to show how the cut-o¤ cjD is inuenced by the bargaining power of
unions in both countries, and nd that(
@cjD
@vj > 0
@cjD
@vz < 0
. (63)
Thus, an increase in the domestic bargaining power of unions, vj , (or a decrease
in the foreign bargaining power of unions, vz) results in an increase in the cut-
o¤ for domestic producers, cjD i.e. it makes it easier for rms to survive in
equilibrium. It is also easy to examine the e¤ects of unionsbargaining power
on each countrys exporters cut-o¤ points using (63), (60) and the condition
required to have a positive value of czD, we can derive that:(
@cjX
@vj =
1
z
@czD
@vj < 0
@cjX
@vz =
1
z
@czD
@vz > 0
, (64)
that is, an increase in the bargaining power of domestic unions, vj , (or a decrease
in the foreign bargaining power of unions, vz) decreases the cut-o¤ of exporters
to country z, cjX .
To summarize, an increase in the domestic bargaining power of unions vj
results (i) as in the closed economy case, in an increase in the cut-o¤ of domestic
producers, cjD, by softening competition in the domestic country, and (ii) in a fall
in the cut-o¤ of domestic exporters to country z, cjX , given that they become
less competitive in the foreign market. However, an increase in the foreign
bargaining power of unions, vz, will result in (i) a reduction in the cut-o¤ of
domestic producers in j, cjD, because rms in j are forced to compete with more
productive rms exporting from z, given that czX decreases, and (ii) an increase
in the cut-o¤ of domestic exporters to country z, cjX , because it results in a
softening of competition in the foreign country.
Using (54) and (60), we compute the average price of varieties sold in country
j, that is:
pj =
 
N jD
N jD +N
z
X
 
4+ vj + 2

+
NzX
N jD +N
z
X
(4+ vz + 2)
!
cjD
4 (+ 1)
. (65)
Substituting the number of domestic producers, N jD = G
j(cjD)N
j
E =

cjD
cM

N jE ,
and the number of producers exporting from z, NzX = G
z(czX)N
z
E =

czX
cM

NzE ,
into (65) and making use of (60), we can rewrite pj as follows:
pj =

N jE
 
4k + vj + 2

+ jNzE (4+ v
z + 2)

cjD
4 (+ 1)

N jE + 
jNzE
 . (66)
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Hence, we notice that using (60), the total number of rms selling in country
j is:
N j = N jD +N
z
X =
 
cjD
cM
! 
N jE + 
jNzE

. (67)
Substituting (66) and (67) into cjD =
1
Nj+
 
+ N j pj

, where cjD = p
j is
the price threshold for positive demand in country j, we obtain an equation for
country j that, together with the analogous expression for country z, forms a
system of two equations that can be solved to derive N jE and N
z
E . Thus, we
nd that the number of entrants in country j is:
N jE =
4 (+ 1) cM
 (2  vj) (1  zj)
264

  cjD


cjD
+1   j (  czD)
(czD)
+1
375 . (68)
Recalling that cjD = c
z
X
j , it is then clear that for N jE > 0 to hold, c
z
X < c
z
D
must also hold. Hence, the minimum e¢ ciency required to export is higher than
that required to operate in the domestic market alone. Moreover, it is clear from
(68) that if the two countries are fully symmetric, with identical size, trade costs
and unionspower, then @N
j
E
@vj < 0 that is, an increase in the bargaining power
of the unions in a country will always reduce the number of rms entering that
country.
Turning to the relationship between wjmD(i) and w
j
mX(i), by making use
of the nding that cjX < c
j
D, it is easy to verify that it is always the case
that wjmD(i) > w
j
mX(i). This suggests that all unions operating in exporting
rms moderate their wage requests in order to gain a better access to foreign
countries  that is, unions internalize the lower market power, resulting from
trade frictions, that their rms have in foreign markets.13
To nd the number of rms operating in country j, substitute (68) into (67)
to obtain:
N j =
4 (+ 1)

cjD
8><>:
( cjD)
(cjD)
+1 j
( czD)
(czD)
+1
(2 vj) +
j
"
( czD)
(czD)
+1 z
( cjD)
(cjD)
+1
#
(2 vz)
9>=>; ,
 (1  jz)
which in the particular case of vj = vz = v becomes:
N j =
4 (+ 1)
 (2  v)

  cjD

cjD
.
Which is similar to the solution found for the closed economy case.
13Consistently, it is easy to show that an increase in the level of integration between two
symmetric economies will shrink this di¤erence.
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Finally, recalling that the number of producers exporting from j to z is:
N jX = G
j(cjX)N
j
E =
 
cjX
cM
!
N jE ,
it is easy to show that, under full symmetry, @N
j
X
@vj < 0. that is, an increase in
the bargaining power of the unions in a country will always reduce the number
of exporting rms from this country.
In summary, the results derived in this section for the open economy with
respect to the e¤ects of unionisation on industry equilibrium are consistent with
those for the closed economy as far as the productivity cut-o¤ of rms producing
only for the domestic market is concerned as in the autarkic case, an increase in
the bargaining power of unions will result in more entry of less e¢ cient rms, i.e.
will result in lower average e¢ ciency composition of the industry. However, an
increase in unionspower will have an opposite e¤ect on the cut-o¤ of exporting
rms in this case it will result in a higher level of e¢ ciency required to survive
in the export market, i.e. it will raise the average e¢ ciency composition of the
exporting population of rms. It is interesting to point out that the nature
of these results does not depend on the level of market integration. However,
at a maximum level of integration, that is if there is free trade, the cut-o¤
points will coincide and hence the nature of the e¤ect of unions power on the
equilibrium distribution of rmsproductivity would be the same for all rms
and correspond to that obtained in the closed economy.
7 Conclusions
Although a large body of literature has focused on the e¤ects of intra-rm di¤er-
ences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted to the
interaction between rmsselection and international performance and labour
market institutions in contrast with the centrality of the latter to current pol-
icy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for national
policies and institutions. In this paper, we have studied the e¤ects of labour
market unionisation on the process of competitive selection between heteroge-
neous rms and have analysed how the interaction between the two is a¤ected
by trade liberalisation between countries with di¤erent unionisation patterns.
Specically, we study the impact of decentralised wage bargaining between rm
specic unions and nal good producers characterised by heterogenous e¢ cien-
cies on the process of competitive selection between rms. The endogenous
determination of wages via bargaining between heterogeneous rms and rm
specic unions implies that wages will di¤er between rms and that ex-ante
identical workers will perceive di¤erent equilibrium wages.
We identify three main channels through which an increase in the bargaining
power of unions a¤ects the nature of the industry equilibrium, namely: (i) a
variety e¤ect by resulting in an increase in the mass of rms selling in the
economy, when the preference for the di¤erentiated good is su¢ ciently strong,
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(ii) a counter competitive e¤ect since a higher union power results in higher
average prices, which in turn entail lower average markups and prots for rms,
and (iii) a selection e¤ect via a reduction of the industry e¢ ciency cut-o¤point,
which results from the markups and prots of less productive rms increasing
more than those of more productive ones. The reason behind this result is that,
for a given bargaining power, a unions rent extraction ability will be higher the
higher is the productivity of the rm with which it negotiates. As a result, a
given increase in the bargaining power of unions will translate in proportionally
higher wage demands in relatively more e¢ cient rms i.e. it will hurt (via a
higher wage) more e¢ cient rms proportionally more than less e¢ cient ones.
Consistent with the existing literature on heterogenous rms, within a two
country setting, we obtain the emerge of two industry e¢ ciency cut-o¤ points,
with only more productive rms engaging in export activity. Starting from a
situation in which countries are identical and the bargaining power of unions
is the same in both countries, an increase in the bargaining power of unions in
one country will always reduce the number of exporting rms from this coun-
try. More generally, when the two countries can be asymmetric not only in
the bargaining power of unions but also in size and market access, a higher
union power produces a fall in the level of e¢ ciency required to survive in the
domestic market and an increase in that required to become exporters from
that country. Thus, a higher bargaining power of unions in one country can be
thought of as (i) softening the competition facing domestic rms (more rms
of a lower e¢ ciency enter the domestic market) and (ii) toughening the com-
petition in the export sector (by increasing the level of e¢ ciency required to
become exporters). Clearly, the e¤ect of an increase in the bargaining power of
unions in the home country will have di¤erent e¤ects on the e¢ ciency cut-o¤
points in the foreign country; there, rms selling only to the domestic market
will face a tougher competition from abroad, while rms that export will face
a softer competition in the country whose bargaining power has increased (i.e.
the minimum e¢ ciency required to survive in the domestic market increase in
the foreign country, while that required to become exporters will fall).
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